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MEMORANDUM FOR: REAR ADMIRAL L. G. STEVENS
CHIEF, JOINT SUBSIDIARY PLANS DIVISION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Mobilization Assignments, OPC.

1. This memorandum anticipates action, in a similar sense and approaching the problems involved in an identical manner, which we understand may be proposed to the Secretary of Defense by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on behalf of the Agency as a whole. In view of the current partially unresolved wartime status of the Office of Policy Coordination, it is deemed advisable that specific arrangements concerning mobilization assignments be entered into as soon as possible on behalf of OPC.

2. OPC mobilization requirements for military personnel fall into four technical categories, involving all services, as follows:

a. Military personnel, active or reserve, in Washington
☐ detailed to CIA or employed by CIA.

b. Military personnel, active or reserve, ☐
detailed to CIA or ☐ employed by CIA.

c. Reserve Military personnel whose mobilization as individuals will be essential to OPC wartime operations in the U. S. and abroad. These individuals will total about 300.

d. Military personnel required for paramilitary operations in theaters. The number of these personnel may rise eventually to as high a figure as 2500.

3. A suitable solution to the problem presented by category 2 d above must wait on the clarification of the general question of the wartime relationship of OPC to the Defense Establishment; it cannot now be determined whether it will be more desirable to mobilize this group directly into the combat forces or through CIA. This paper therefore is addressed to the problems presented by categories 2 a, 2 b and 2 c.

4. Reserve

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4. Reserve personnel in category 2 a are, in general, covered by existing policies under which most of them are given CIA mobilization assignments, unless they elect otherwise, for personal reasons (usually preference for other units on the basis of pay, etc.). In the case of individuals not electing CIA mobilization assignments, compulsion is not now being exercised, but consideration should be given to earmarking them for CIA mobilization assignments, if requested by OPC, regardless of individual preference.

5. In the case of active personnel detailed to OPC (category 2 a) it is believed that a considerable number of them would prefer to go back eventually to their basic service in case of war. So far as possible, OPC would interpose no overall objection to such action. It is believed essential, however, for OPC to have the right to hold these individuals in their current assignments for a reasonable length of time after full mobilization, so as not to disrupt the work of this office, much of which will at that time have a predominantly military flavor. This objective could be obtained by securing mobilization assignments to CIA for active personnel who are now detailed to CIA or who will be so detailed in the future.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] it would be most natural for the military authorities in the event of an emergency to mobilize or assign these personnel to conventional military tasks, to the detriment of [REDACTED] tasks which they should be performing normally for the Theater Commander involved. Since these personnel, as individuals, are subject to constant change, it would appear desirable that a policy be established that such personnel should be given CIA mobilization assignments for OPC operations. Accredited OPC or CIA representatives abroad would be charged, in the event of mobilization, with bringing these assignments to the attention of the appropriate military authorities. In the early stages of mobilization this proposed policy should involve probably no more than about 100 individuals.

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7. In the event of partial or complete mobilization and before the outbreak of hostilities OPC will require about 300 individual reserve military personnel (category 2 c) divided in about the following proportion: 55% Army, 25% Air Force, 20% Navy and Marine Corps. Here the problem is one of earmarking known individuals. It has been discovered that several qualified reserve officers already have been given mobilization assignments of an essentially routine nature. It would appear to be desirable to establish a quota for CIA (assigned to OPC) of 300 over and above other CIA requirements. This quota should be filled gradually by the

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selection of individuals. In cases where there is competition for the services of any individual, the needs of OPC should be given a reasonable but not overriding priority.

8. Your reactions to the proposals outlined above will be appreciated. If you regard them as sound, it is requested that you take steps to achieve their implementation.

Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

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